Withdrawal from prosecution (Section 321 of CrPc)

(a) If it is before a charge has been framed, the accused shall be discharged in respect of such offence or offences;

(b) If it is made after a charge has been framed, or when under this Code no charge is required, he shall be acquitted in respect of such offence or offences.

However, such offence;

(i) Was against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends; or

(ii) Was investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946; or

(iii) Involved the misappropriation or destruction of, or damage to, any property belonging to the Central Government; or

(iv) Was committed by a person in the service of the Central Government while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, and the Prosecutor in charge of the case has not been appointed by the Central Government, he shall not, unless he has been permitted by the Central Government to do so, move the Court for its consent to withdraw from the prosecution and the Court shall, before according consent, direct the Prosecutor to produce before it the permission granted by the Central Government to withdraw from the prosecution.

In Rahul Agarwal v. Rakesh Jain, the permission for withdrawal of prosecution was granted on the ground that the case was pending for a long time and accused was not a habitual criminal. The case was posted for examination of accused and no inquiry was made as to why case was pending. It was held that the order permitting withdrawal of prosecution when prosecution evidence was about to be over at any point of time, is not proper. It was also held that the permission for withdrawal of prosecution can be granted only in the interest of justice and for valid reasons.

When manner of committing offence must be stated (Section 213 of CrPc)


(a) A is accused of the theft of a certain article at a certain time and place. The charge need not set out the manner in which the theft was effected.

(b) A is accused of cheating B at a given time and place. The charge must set out the manner in which A cheated B.

(c) A is accused of giving false evidence at a given time and place. The charge must set out that portion of the evidence given by A which is alleged to be false.

(d) A is accused of obstructing B, a public servant, in the discharge of his public functions at a given time and place. The charge must set out the manner in which A obstructed B in the discharge of his functions.

(e) A is accused of the murder of B at a given time and place. The charge need not state the manner in which A murdered B.

(f) A is accused of disobeying a direction of the law with intent to save B from punishment. The charge must set out the disobedience charged and the law infringed.

What rules must be followed for Double Jeopardy?

(1) The person must be accused of an ‘offence’. The word ‘offence’ in General Clauses Act means ‘any act or omission made punishable by law for the time being in force’.

(2) The ‘offence’ must be the same for which he was prosecuted and punished in the previous proceedings.

(3) The proceeding or the prosecution must have taken place before a ‘Court’ or ‘judicial tribunal’ and not before departmental and administrative authorities.

(4) The person must have been prosecuted and punished in the previous proceeding.

Article 20(2) will have no application where punishment is not for the same offence.’ Thus, if the offences are distinct the rule of double jeopardy will not apply. Likewise, Article 20(2) does not apply where the person is prosecuted and punished for the second time and subsequent proceeding is mere continuation of the previous proceeding, e.g., in the case of an appeal against acquittal. There is a bar to a second prosecution only when the accused has been both prosecuted and punished.

Cases in which Specific Performance of Contract Enforceable – Section 10 | Specific Relief Act

2. Agreement for sale:

No relief can be given in suit for specific per­formance of agreement for sale of house unless it is specific and consistent with pleadings and proof. Since, amendment was not incorporated by plain­tiff hence no relief on the point of amendment was permitted.

3. Agreement for specific performance—Time is not the essence of contract:

It is a well settled principle that time is not the essence of the contract with respect to an agreement for specific performance, as has been held yet it has to be held that even if time is not essence of the contract, the Court may infer that it has to be performed within a reason­able time.

4. Agreement of reconveyance:

Where suit for specific performance of agreement of reconveyance of property was filed after payment of loan taken by plaintiff it was held that after receiving back amount given as loan, defendant was bound to perform the terms of agreement of reconveyance.

5. Agreement of sale:

Specific performance was refused by High Court by determining the agreement of sale as invalid, on the ground that the provisions of Section 33 of Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959, invalidates such agreement of sale, because the suit properties were sub­ject to charge on the date of sale, since the seller had taken a loan on security of goods.

This plea making a ground to challenge specific performance is taken for the first time before Supreme Court and was not raised before Appellate Court. There is no evidence on record to prove that such loan was taken by the seller as alleged by purchaser. Therefore, it was held that agreement of sale is valid and specific performance could be granted.

6. Agreement to sell:

Everybody concerned in the matter proceeded on the assumption that there were two houses, one occupied by defen­dants and another in the occupation of the tenants. The agreement men­tions the house in which the defendants were living as the subject matter of the agreement.

The words ‘entire house’ cannot in any way militate against this fact. It will only be the entire house in which the defendants were living. As we stated earlier, the plaintiff was aware of the fact that there was a portion of the premises which was referred to and understood as a separate house by all those concerned and which was in the occupation of the ten­ants. If the agreement was to include that portion also it was his duty to have it specifically mentioned in the agreement. Hot having done so he has got to fail in his claim regarding that portion of the house.

7. Agreement to sell—Execution of:

The plaintiffs were willing and ready to perform their part of the contract and plaintiffs were not required to aver or prove that they have tendered balance amount of Rs. 5,000/- to the defendants at any point of time. In view of the above, substantial question of law formulated above, is decided in favour of plaintiffs appel­lants.

8. Allowability of:

In absence any stipulation that time is essence of agreement of absence of any plea in written statement that time is essence of agreement and also in absence of any issue on this point the new plea by defendant on this point was not to be allowed.

Since the application for amendment of the plaint came to be filed after the expiry of there years certainly it changed the cause of action. Cause of action was sought to be amended. Amendment was rightly re­jected.

9. Amendment:

The suit is required to be filed within three years from the date fixed by the parties under the contract. Since the application for amendment of the plaint came to be filed after the expiry of three years, certainly it changed the cause of action as required to be specified in the plaint. The suit for mandatory injunction is field and the specific perfor­mance was sought for by way of an amendment. The cause of action is required to be stated initially in the plaint but it was not pleaded.

It was sought to be amended, along-with an application for specific performance which was rejected. Under these circumstances, even by the date of filing of the application, namely, 5.11.1992, the suit was barred by limitation. The High Court, therefore, was right in refusing to permit the amendment of the plaint.

10. Applicability of:

In case of interim injunction against transfer of suit property on the condition that plaintiff will provide the Bank guarantee, non-compliance of the condition does not disturb the applicability of the rule of lis pendens.

This doctrine has been applied mostly in the sphere of administrative law to enforce the assurance held out to grant tax concessions and such other benefits; these cases do not involve the difficulties which deter the Courts from specifically enforcing the terms of a building contract; in these cases (when doctrine of promissory estoppel are applied), there is no other remedy to the aggrieved person such as obtaining compensation from the Government or its agencies.

11. Basis of:

Doctrine of promissory estoppel has certain special fea­tures, it is based on the conduct of the Government and its agencies as against the conduct of those who acted upon the assurance held out by the Government and its agencies; the alteration of position by the party is the indispensable requirement of the doctrine and it is not necessary to prove, further, any damage, detriment or prejudice to the party asserting the es­toppel.

“The basis of this doctrine is the interposition of equity which has always, true to its form, stepped in to mitigate the rigour of strict law.”

12. Contractual right:

The contractual right is a property right and it cannot be affected by an adverse executive order. There was an enacted law by which all the existing rights of the petitioners under the contracts granted by the State Government were terminated and monopoly was cre­ated. Said law was challenged. The effect of the impugned law and the contentions were referred to by the Supreme Court:

“It is not in dispute that by the provisions of this Act all the existing contracts between parties and the State and existing grants in re­spect of collection, transport, storage and otherwise dealing with resin have come to forthwith terminate and a monopoly situation has been created qua these operations in resin in favour of the Government Company. The Act does not provide for any compen­sation and the petitioners maintain that the existing rights in their favour amounted to property and could not have been expropriated in contravention of the guarantee in Part III of the Constitution. It is the stand of the State that the benefits and privileges conferred on the three petitioner either under contract or under Government or­ders did not constitute property and by the provisions of the Act no transfer of such property has taken place.”

In the next paragraph, the Supreme Court pointed out that Articles 19 (1) (f) and 31 of the Constitution continued to operate in State of Jammu & Kashmir, since the 44th amendment to the Constitution was inapplicable to the said State. After referring to certain decisions, Supreme Court found that:

“…..the interests which are in dispute before us do constitute property entitled to protection under Article 19 (1) (f) and are covered by Article 31 (2) of the Constitution.”

The impugned Act did not provide for payment of any compensation. Further, a few of the petitioners were entitled to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel. After referring to this doctrine, the Court said:

“Where inclined to agree with the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners that the circumstances gave rise to a fact situation of estoppel, it is true that there is no estoppel against the Legislature and the vires of the Act cannot be tested by invoking the plea but so far as the State Government is concerned the rule of estoppel does apply and the precedents of this Court are clear. It is unnecessary go to into that aspect of the matter as in our considered opinion the impugned Act suffers from the vice of taking away rights to property without providing for compensation at all and is hit by Article 31 (2) of the Constitution.”

13. Denial of:

It is too late in the day to deny a claim for specific performance of an agreement to sell an immovable property in existence or to be brought into existence according to the specification agreed to merely because the Vendor had to make applications or move the concerned and competent authorities to obtain permission/sanction or consent of such authorities to make the sale agreed to be made an effective and full-fledged one.

It can always be made conditional and dependent upon the renewal of the lease and revalidation of the building plans. There is no justification whatsoever in law or on facts on record to deny the relief to the appellants where it could possibly and legitimately be directed and rendered execut­able. Subject to the competent authorities so according or making the re­quired orders in this regard.

14. Determination:

In agreement to sell the time is not always es­sence of contract, unless the contract itself stipulates a date for its perfor­mance.

15. Effect of:

There was delay in seeking performance in-spite of fixed time limit for performance. Enhancement in prices of properties should be considered while exercising discretion grant relief of specific performance. When rights of third parties came into existence then in the face of such circumstance, relief of specific performance was rightly declined.

Where new plea was not raised before the Courts below and no evidence in support of such plea was produced before the Courts below it was held that the High Court erred in law in recording a finding on the basis of such plea.

16. Family settlement:

Where in a suit for enforcement of family settle­ment by wife, interim order was passed to pay interim maintenance, arrears and schools fees of daughter etc., and provide separate resident to her, no interference with order called for as same being discretionary order. How­ever, having legal to serious challenge to validity of settlement Trial Court directed to dispose off suit expeditiously.

17. Fixation of period:

The Trial Court relied upon three circumstances in support of its conclusion that time was of the essence of the contract of sale:

(i) Though no time was prescribed by the oral agreement, in the agreements in writing, there were definite stipulations Fixing dates for performance of the contract;

(ii) That the second and the third agreements contained clauses which imposed penalties upon the party guilty of default; and

(iii) That appellant Nos. 1 and 2 were in urgent need of money and it was to meet their pressing need that they desired to effect sale of the property. But the agreements do not express in unmistak­able language that time was to be of the essence and existence of the default clause will not necessarily evidence such inten­tion.

Fixation of the period within which the contract is to be performed does not make the stipulation as to time of the essence of the contract.

It is true that appellant Nos. 1 and 2 were badly in need of money, but they had secured Rs. 3,006/- from the respondent to presumably tide over their difficulties at least temporarily. There is no evidence that when the respondent did not advance the full consideration they made other arrangement Intention to make time of the essence of the contract may be evi­denced by either express stipulations or by circumstances which are suffi­ciently strong to displace the ordinary presumption that in a contract of sale of land stipulations as to time are not of the essence.

In the present case, there is no express stipulation, and the circumstances are not such as to indicate that it was the intention of the parties that time was intended to be of the essence of the contract. It is true that even if time was not originally of the essence, the appellants could by notice served upon the respondent call upon him to take the conveyance within the time fixed and intimate that in default of compliance with the requisition the contract will be treated as cancelled.

As observed in Stickney v. Keeble, 1915 AC 386, where in a contract for the sale of land the time fixed for completion is not made of the essence of the contract, but the vendor has been guilty of unnecessary delay, the purchaser may serve upon the vendor a notice limiting a time at the expiration of which he will treat the contract as at an end.

The Supreme Court observed that fixation of the period within which the contract is to be performed does not make the stipulation as time being the essence of the contract. If the time was not originally the essence, it was open to the appellant to call upon the other party for performance of his part of the contract and to take conveyance within the time fixed by paying the sale consideration.

18. Grant of:

The clause relating to payment of various amounts un­der the contract including the sum of Rs. 4 lakhs states that the time is the essence. Moreover, by his letter, also the appellant has made payment of Rs. 4 lakhs within a period of seven days from the date of notice of the essence of the contract pointing but the circumstances which require pay­ment of Rs. 4 lakhs within a reasonable time. As the respondent did not comply and was unwilling and/ or unable to supply with this term of the agreement, he cannot be considered as ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.

In the present case, the right of the appellant to purchase suitable residential accommodation is seriously affected by non-payment of Rs. 4 lakhs within a reasonable time. The respondent had failed to comply with the term of the agreement relating to payment of this amount. In these circumstances, in any case, a decree for specific performance cannot be granted as it would be unfair and unreasonable to do so. The High Court, therefore, was not right in setting aside the judgment and order of the trial Court.

The Court in its discretion can impose any reasonable condition includ­ing payment of an additional amount by one party to the other while grant­ing or refusing decree of specific performance. Whether the purchaser shall be directed to pay an additional amount to the seller or converse would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a case.

Ordinarily, the plaintiff is not to be denied the relief of specific performance only on account of the phenomenal increase of price during the pendency of litigation. That may be in a given case one of the considerations besides many others to be taken into consideration for refusing the decree of specific performance.

Where the respondent had failed to comply with the term of the agree­ment relating to payment of the amount, the decree for specific perfor­mance held not to be granted.

19. Jurisdiction of Court:

Provision of contract providing for liqui­dated damages, does not bar jurisdiction of the Court to grant decree of specific performance.

20. Legality of:

Decree of specific performance reversed on the ground that the plaintiff was not willing to perform his part of contract as no such averment was made in the plaint by him. Therefore reversal of decree in second appeal held to be improper.

Ordinarily, the plaintiff is not to be denied the relief of specific perfor­mance only on account of the phenomenal increase of price during the pendency of litigation. That may be, in a given case, one of the consider­ations besides many others to be taken into consideration for refusing the decree of specific performance. As a general rule, it cannot be held that ordinarily the plaintiff cannot be allowed to have, for her alone, the entire benefit of phenomenal increase of the value of the property during the pendency of the litigation.

21. Limitation:

Where cause of action arose on expiry of eight years from the date of execution of later sale-deed i.e., 20.7.1973, and appellant by conduct refused to execute the sale-deed on 19.7.1976, the suit filed on 20.7.1976 was within limitation from the date of refusal i.e., 19.71976 i.e., next day.

22. Permissibility of:

Joint application was made by plaintiff and de­fendant in Court setting up agreement for sale with option to repurchase. Court permitted the sale and sale-deed was also executed. There was no mention of agreement of repurchase in the order or in the sale-deed nor detailed plea as to novation was made. Therefore, inference of giving up of original agreement of repurchase does not arise and agreement still exists.

23. Presumption:

The fixation of period within the contract has to be performed does not make the stipulation as to time being the essence of the contract, when a contract relates to sale of immovable property, it will normally be presumed that the time is not the essence of the contract.

24. Promissory estoppel:

The true principle of promissory estoppel seems to be that where, one party has by his words or conduct made to other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the prom­ise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any preexisting relationship between the parties or not.

The doctrine of promissory estoppel need not be inhib­ited by the same limitation as estoppel in the strict sense of the term. It is an equitable principle evolved by the Courts for doing justice and there is no reason why it should be given only a limited application by way of de­fence.

There is no reason in logic or principle why promissory estoppel should also not be available as a cause of action, if necessary to satisfy the equity. It is not necessary, in order to attract the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, that the promises, acting in reliance on the prom­ise, should suffer any detriment. What is necessary is only that the prom­isee should have altered his position in reliance on the promise.

But if by detriment we mean injustice to the promisee which would result if the promi­sor were the recede from his promise, then detriment would certainly come in as a necessary ingredient. The detriment in such a case is not some prejudice suffered by the promisee by acting on the promise, but the preju­dice would be caused to the promisee, if the promisor were allowed to go back from the promise.

If specific performance of a contract is not enforceable under the pro­visions of the Specific Relief Act, said disability cannot be overcome by resort to the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Enforceability of a contract depends upon its terms and non-availability of any other remedy; enforce­ment of an assurance under the doctrine of promissory estoppel is based not on terms of the contract, but the nature of the assurance held out which is acted upon by others to whom assurance is held out and by such action, the assured persons altered their position.

25. Question of:

Where the contract was quite clear and definite the fact that the vendee was asked to consult his pleader and get pacci receipt executed did not make the contract dependent upon the vendee consulting his pleader and getting the pacci receipt.

26. Question of title:

In this case, the parties to the suit went on trial of the suit only on the issue whether the relief for specific performance of the agreement for sale could be granted in the suit. In absence of such an issue, it is not open to appellant who claims to be the purchaser from defendant, to contend that defendant has title to the land.

27. Reconveyance of property covered by the sale deed:

In this case, the suit was filed by the plaintiff-appellant seeking reconveyance of the property covered by the sale-deed executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant and requiring the defendant to perform the agreement of Reconveyance specifically as entered into in the joint application of the plaintiff and the defendant. The defendant, having got the sale-deed only upon implementation of the obligation covered by the agreement of sale cannot approbate and reprobate and contend that the other part of the agreement regarding reconveyance need not be implemented. Unless there is a detailed plea and also evidence that before execution of the sale-deed there was novation and the parties expressly agreed to give a go-by to the agreement of reconveyance, no inference could be drawn that the agree­ment of reconveyance contained in the agreement of sale which preceded the sale-deed was given a go-by.

28. Registration:

Suit was filed under Section 10 of S.R. Act, seeking relief of direction to defendant to present sale-deed executed by him for registration. Since, alternative remedy under Section 77 is not a bar against the suit, hence, suit was maintainable and agreement to sell can be en­forced, when various steps contemplated by Section 77 are not taken.

29. Specific performance:

In the instance case special leave was granted against the decision of Madras High Court to appeal to Supreme Court.

‘A’ and his mother ‘R’ sold their agricultural lands, measuring 3 acres and 25 acres in consideration of Rs. 10,000/- and Rs. 75,000/-, to ‘S’ and his father ‘M’ under two sale-deeds, dated 17.4.1962. Rs. 500/- were taken back from the vendees and again two separate agreements were made giv­ing a right of repurchase of property to venders to be exercised between 17.4.1969 to

‘R’ and ‘A’ executed agreement of sale of the same property to T on dated 4.1.1963 for a consideration of Rs. 1, 30,000/-. Appellant paid Rs. 30,000/- from time to time till April 1963, to ‘A’ and ‘R’. Agreement of sale dated 16.4.1963 and dated 15.3.1963 were executed and registered by ‘R’ and ‘A’ respectively for Rs. 87,500/- and Rs. 12.500/- respectively for the payment of balance sum by appellant. Appellant further paid Rs. 4,000/- and Rs. 1,000/- were handed over to appellant. ‘M’ died leaving behind his widow and ‘S’ his son as his legal representative. The legal representa­tive of ‘M’ and ‘S’ refused to execute reconveyance deed. Appellant T filed two suits for specific performance of reconveyance agreements.

Appellant deposited amount of Rs. 9,900/- in the Court to be paid to ‘S’ and ‘?’ and Rs. 1,600/- for payment to ‘A’. Appellant deposited Rs. 74,500/ – for payment to ‘S’ and ‘P’ and Rs. 9.000/- to ‘R’.

Both the suits were decreed ex parte on 7.1.1974. ‘R’ and ‘A’ did not file application for setting aside the ex parte decree. On application of ‘S’ and ‘P’ ex parte decree was set aside and applicants were allowed to con­test suit on merits. Trial Court decreed the suit against ‘S’ and ‘P’ against which appeals were preferred in High Court which set aside decision of Trial Court and dismissed both the suits. T’ filed two appeals challenging deci­sion of High Court.

The above facts were almost admitted with regard, all exhibits High Court was of the view that rights of reconveyances were not assigned by ‘A’ and ‘R’ in favour of appellant, ‘T’.

High Court further observed that no privity of contracts could be in­tended or existed between ‘S’ and ‘P’ and plaintiff T’. Exhibits do not imply any right of assignments. Agreements are deeds of resale by ‘M’ and ‘?’ in favour of ‘A’ and ‘R’. Resale was contemplated at any time after 7 years upto 10 years on receipt of consideration of Rs. 74,500/- and Rs. 9.900/-. Such right of resale could not be exercised by a stranger to the agreement. The contention of High Court that the plaintiff did not represent interest of ‘A’ and R’ was wrong. In fact rights of reconveyance were assigned by ‘A’ and ‘R’ in favour of plaintiff T’.

By depositing the money plaintiff had well-expressed his will to be al­ways ready and willing to perform his part of contract. High Court’s decision was therefore not justified. High Court erred in holding that plaintiff could have got executed sale-deeds within 2 years whereas the period to exercise such right was three years.

Ex parte decree against ‘R’ and ‘A’ has become final. ‘S’ and ‘M’ were bound to make resale in favour of ‘A’ and ‘R’ and their assignee. ‘S’ and ‘M’ did not plead non-execution of exhibits or have lost their right of reconveyance of property.

In the instance case, plaintiff T acquired valid title to claim specific performance. Judgment of High Court set aside.

30. Specific performance of contract:

The plaint contains not only a prayer for specific performance but also a prayer for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of the plain­tiffs and from creating any documents or entering into any transaction in respect of the suit property.

Whether the plaintiffs are able to prove that they are in possession of the suit property as on the date of suit and establish that they are entitled to the injunction prayed for, is a different matter from the maintainability or tenability of their case for specific performance.

There is also the question whether the relief of injunction can be treated as being only a relief consequential to the relief of specific performance and the denial of one would automatically lead to the denial of the other, or whether it is an independent relief in itself and even if the plaintiffs are not entitled to a decree for specific performance they would still be entitled to a decree for injunction, a relief the grant of which is, of course, in the discre­tion of the Court.

It may be noticed that a suit for injunction would be governed by the residuary article, Article 113 of the Limitation Act and the cause of action for the said relief arises when the right to sue accrues. That would depend upon the Court deciding when the right accrued, on the pleadings and the evidence in the case. Therefore, the suit insofar as it relates to the prayer for a decree for perpetual injunction cannot be held to be barred by limitation at this preliminary stage. In any event, therefore, the dismissal of the suit as a whole as not maintainable, could not be justified or said to be correct.

In such a situation, when the whole matter requires reconsideration it would not be proper to go into the various arguments urged by the counsel in this case. The interests of justice would be sub-served by setting aside the finding by the Courts below that the suit is barred by limitation, even while upholding the finding that the trial Court had the jurisdiction to try the suit and remanding the suit to the trial Court for a decision of all the issues arising therein, including the issue of limitation, in accordance with law after giving the parties an opportunity to adduce evidence in support of their respective cases.

31. Specific performance—Refusal of:

A person who seeks the equi­table relief of specific performance should come to Court with clean hands and any false case set up by him would disentitle him to the equitable relief of specific performance.

32. Sustainability of:

Purchaser deposited balance amount of consid­eration as per contract agreement with seller instead of in Court and at­tempting to procure sale deed within a period prescribed by trial Court. Therefore, specific performance of contract of sale could not be denied by raising new plea for the first time in second appeal.

Merely because the plaintiff did not deposit the balance amount of consideration into Court the suit could not be dismissed.

Section 13 – Information to Parent, Guardian or Probation Officer – Juvenile Justice (Care And Protection Of Children)

(a) The parent or guardian of the juvenile, if he can be found of such arrest and direct him to be present at the Board before which the juvenile will appear; and

(b) The probation officer of such arrest to enable him to obtain information regarding the antecedents and family background of the juvenile and other material circumstances likely to be of assistance to the Board for making inquiry.


When a juvenile in conflict with law is arrested and brought to police station, it shall be duty of the officer-in-charge of the Police Station to inform the parent or guardian of the juvenile, if they can be found, about the arrest and direct him to appear before the Juvenile Justice Board where the juvenile is to be produced.

The Police shall also inform the concerned Probation Officer about such arrest so that the latter may obtain information regarding antecedents and family background of the juvenile and submit it to the Board for its assistance in making inquiry.

Thus the main purpose of the provisions contained in this section is to inform the parents or guardian about the arrest of juvenile so that they may be present before the Board, and make necessary arrangements for the bail etc. of the juvenile.

Section 20 – Special provision in respect of pending cases – Juvenile Justice (Care And Protection Of Children)

The essence of this section may be stated thus—

(i) The proceedings pending before the Juvenile Court at the commencement of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 will be continued as if this Act were not passed; and

(ii) If the Juvenile Court at the conclusion of proceeding finds the juvenile guilty of having committed the offence, it shall not itself make an order of sentence but instead forward the case to the Juvenile Justice Board constituted under the Act of 2000. The Board after making an inquiry if finds the juvenile guilty of the offence, it shall make an appropriate order against him as provided under Section 15 of the Act.

In Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan, the Court considered the various provisions of the 2000 Act, as amended in 2006, and, in particular Section 7 A which has to be read in tendem with Section 20 as amended in 2006 and Rules 98 of the J. J. Rules, 2007. Section 7 A provides the procedure to be followed when claim of juvenility is raised before any Court.

The claim of juvenility may be raised before any Court and it shall be recognised at any stage, even after the final disposal of the case. Section 20 specially provides for the procedure which the court is required to adopt when such claim of juvenility is raised.

Section 64 of the Act deals with a situation where the juvenile in conflict with law is already undergoing sentence at the commencement of the Act while Rule 98 deals with disposal of cases of juveniles in conflict with law. The State Government or the Juvenile Board may, either suo motu or on application made for the purpose, review the case of a person’s a juvenile in conflict with law. The Court allowed the appeal and directed that the appellant be released forthwith.

The Supreme Court in Bijender Singh v. State of Haryana held that Section 20 of the Act would be applicable when a person is below the age of 18 years as on 01.4.2001. It must be shown that (i) on this date (i.e., date of coming into force of the Act) the proceedings in which the petitioner was accused was pending, and (ii) on that day he was below the age of 18 years. For the purpose of applicability of Section 20 of the J.J. Act 2000, both the aforementioned conditions are required to be fulfilled.

In Eerati Laxman v. State of Andhra Pradesh, the Supreme Court clarified that while calculating a person’s age, the day of his birth must be counted as a whole day and any specified age in law is to be computed as having been attained on the day preceding the anniversary of the birthday. According to the Court a legal day commences at 12 O’ clock mid-night and continues until the same hour of the following night.

Thus, when the accused was born on 10 May, 1978 the said day was to be counted as a whole day and it could not be said that he had attained the age of 16 years (now it is 18 years both for males and females) before 12 O’clock in the night of the previous day, i.e., 9th May 1994.

The offence having been committed at about 1-00 p.m. 9/5/1994 he was a juvenile at the time of offence. The impugned judgment was, therefore set aside and the matter was remitted to the Juvenile Justice Board on terms of Section 20 of the Act. The appeal was allowed with aforesaid direction.

The provisions of the J.J. Act, 2000 would be applicable to those cases initiated and pending trial/inquiry for the offences committed under the 1986 Act, provided that a person had not completed 18 years of age as on 1.4.2001. The net result is:—

(a) The reckoning date for the determination of the age of the juvenile is the date of an offence and not the date when he is produced before the authority or the Court.

(b) The J.J. Act, 2000, would be applicable in pending proceeding in any court/authority initiated under the 1986 Act, and is pending when the J.J. Act, 2000 came into force and the person had not completed 18 years of age as on 1.4.2001.

In Nasir Ali v. State of Rajasthan the appellant was a juvenile who set his wife ablaze causing her death. As per Rule 62 (2) of the Juvenile Justice Rules, the appellant was below 18 years of age on the date of incident and therefore, he could not be sentenced in view of Section 20 of the J.J. Act of 2000.

In Raju v. State of Rajasthan, there was allegation of forming unlawful assembly and attempt to murder against the petitioner. Except Photostat copies of mark-sheets no other evidence was adduced by petitioner despite opportunities provided by Court and ultimately evidence was closed on assertion that petitioner did not want to lead evidence.

Court had considered arrest memos, information furnished by the petitioner, remand form and Vakalatnama wherein age of the petitioner was shown as 18 years. Therefore, for want of legal proof mark-sheets produced by petitioner could not be treated as conclusive proof of age of the petitioner, hence order rejecting his application was proper.

In Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana, the petitioner (accused) was the younger brother of the main accused who was found guilty of the offence of dowry death under Section 304-B, I.P.C. The petitioner was 17 years of age on the date of incident.

The said offence was committed prior to coming into force of J.J. Act, 2000. As the accused had completed 18 years of age before coming into force of the 2000 Act, hence he was not entitled to the benefit of both the Acts, i.e., the J.J. Act, 1986 [Section 2 (4)), and J.J. Act of 2000 (Section 20)]. The appeal was, therefore, disallowed.

In Satish alias Dhanna v. State of M.P. and others, the question involved was whether benefit of the Probation Act may be extended to pending cases under Sections 16 and 20 of the Act. This was an appeal against the conviction for offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 302 read with Section 149, I. P. C.

The appellant had not completed 18 years of age on the date of occurrence and date of production before Court. His date of birth was 12-11-1980. This fact was fully established. Also Section 16 of the Act provides that no juvenile shall be sentenced to death or imprisonment for life or committed to prison in default of payment of fine or in default of failing to furnish security.

Section 20 provides special protection in respect of pending cases. Referring to its earlier decisions in Bhola Bhagat v. State of Bihar, and Gopinath Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, the Court held that an accused who was juvenile cannot be denied the benefit of protection of the provisions of Protection of Offenders Act.

However, the Apex Court held that at this distant point of time to refer the appellant to the Juvenile Board would not be proper. Therefore, while sustaining the conviction for the offence for which he has been found guilty, the sentence awarded is restricted to the period already under­gone. The appellant was ordered to be released from custody forthwith unless required to be in custody in connection with any other case.

Section 15 – Order that may be passed regarding juvenile – Juvenile Justice (Care And Protection Of Children)

(b) Direct the juvenile to participate in group counselling and similar activities;

(c) Order the juvenile to perform community service;

(d) Order the parent of the juvenile or the juvenile himself to pay a fine, if he is over fourteen years of age and earns money;

(e) Direct the juvenile to be released on probation of good conduct and placed under the care of any parent, guardian or other fit person, or such parent, guardian or other fit person executing a bond, with or without surety, as the Board may require, for the good behaviour and well-being of the juvenile for any period not exceeding three years;

(f) Direct the juvenile to be released on probation of good conduct and placed under the care of any fit institution for the good behaviour and well-being of juvenile for any period not exceeding three years;

[(g) Make an order directing the juvenile to be sent to a special home for a period of three years:

Provided that the Boards may, if it is satisfied that having regard to the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the case, it is expedient so to do, for reasons to be recorded, reduce the period of stay to such period as it thinks fit.]

(2) The Board shall obtain the social investigation report on juvenile either through a Probation Officer or a recognised voluntary organisation or otherwise, and shall take into consideration the findings of such report before passing an order.

(3) Where an order under clause (d), (e) or (J) of sub-section (1) is made, the Board may, if it is of opinion that in the interests of the juvenile and of the public, it is expedient so to do, in addition make an order that the juvenile in conflict with law shall remain under the supervision of a Probation Officer named in the order during such period, not exceeding three years as may be specified therein, and may in such supervision order impose such conditions as it deems necessary for the due supervision of the juvenile in conflict with law:

Provided that if at any time afterwards it appears to the Board on receiving a report from the Probation Officer or otherwise, that the juvenile in conflict with law has not been of good behaviour during the period of supervision or that the fit institution under whose care the juvenile was placed is no longer able or willing to ensure the good behaviour and well-being of the juvenile it may, after making such inquiry as it deems fit, order the juvenile in conflict with law to be sent to a special home.

(4) The Board shall while making a supervision order under sub-section (3), explain to the juvenile and the parent, guardian or other fit person or fit institution, as the case may be, under whose care the juvenile has been placed, the terms and conditions of the order and shall forthwith furnish one copy of the supervision order to the juvenile, the parent, guardian or other fit person or fit institution, as the case may be, the sureties, if any, and the Probation Officer.


The section enumerates the various orders that may be passed by the Juvenile Justice Board against the juvenile found guilty of an offence.

Discharge after Admonition:

In case the offence is not of a serious nature, the Board may order discharge of the juvenile after admonition. The provisions relating to discharge an offender after admonition are also contained in Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. Generally, the Court or the Board will pass an order of discharge of juvenile after admonition in the following cases :—

(i) Any offence which is punishable under Sections 379, 380, 381, 404 or 420 of the Indian Penal Code;

(ii) Offences which are punishable with less than two years’ imprisonment with or without fine under the Indian Penal Code or any other law for the time being in force.

But the pre-condition for such release is that there should be no previous conviction of the accused or the juvenile.

In Jaipal Singh Tej Singh v. Ram Avtar Devilal, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh held that for allowing the benefit of release after admonition to an accused, the Court (for the purpose of J.J. Act, the Juvenile Justice Board) shall take into consideration (i) the circumstances of the case; (ii) the nature of the offence; and (iii) the character and antecedents of the accused or juvenile, as the case may be.

While discharging the juvenile after admonition, the Board should warn him that he shall have to face the sentence in case he repeats the offence or commits any other offence in future. This view finds support in the decision in State v. Ghanshaymdas, wherein the Court held that, “admonition by a Judge is a reprimand, a censure or a re-proof warning the accused that he is let-off, but in case of repetition he will be punished severely in accordance with law.”

Release of Juvenile on Probation of good conduct:

The Juvenile Justice Board may order the release of juvenile in conflict with law on probation of good conduct and place him under the care of his parents, guardian or any other proper person. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the Board may also direct the juvenile to enter into a bond, with or without sureties. But the period of such order of release on probation shall not exceed three years.

Besides, the Board may order the placement of the Juvenile in a Special Home. But the period of such placement—

(i) Shall not be less than two years where the age of juvenile is more than 17 years but less than 18 years;

(ii) In case of other juveniles, until they complete the age of being treated as juvenile, i.e., eighteen years, both for boys as well as girls.

The release of a person on probation being a treatment reaction to crime, it offers an opportunity to the juvenile to reform and rehabilitate himself. This is why it is considered as a better alternative for the juveniles in conflict with law rather than their prisonisation where there are chances of their contamination in association with hardened criminals. But at the same time, the Board should make sure that release of juvenile on probation is not being misused by him for ulterior purposes.

It is the discretion of the Court to allow the benefit of release on probation to an accused but such discretion should be exercised judicially and probation should not be allowed in cases of serious offences.

In Municipal Corporation, Delhi v. Rattan Lai, it was held that while allowing the benefit of release on probation to an accused, the Court should take into consideration (i) the circumstances of the case; (ii) the nature of the offence; (iii) age and character of the offender, and his antecedents; (iv) family background; and (v) previous conviction of the accused, if any.

The Board may also order under this section that juvenile be placed under the supervision of the Probation Officer for a period not exceeding three years where it finds that such placement is in the interest of the juvenile or in public interest. The Probation Officers shall submit the periodical report about the juvenile and his progress in reformation.

Where on the basis of the Probation Officer’s report the Board finds that the juvenile is not keeping good behaviour or it is difficult to keep him under control, it may order the placement of such probationer juvenile to Special Home.

Where the Board orders the custody of the juvenile to any person or Special Home, care has to be taken to ensure that he is not being imparted any religious education which is contrary to his own religious faith or conviction.

Section 28 – Alternative Punishment – Juvenile Justice (Care And Protection Of Children)


This section lays down that if any offence which is punishable under the Juvenile Justice ( Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, is also included as an offence and made punishable under any other law passed by the State or the Central Government, then in that case, the person who is found guilty of any such offence shall be liable to punishment either under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 or the said State or Central Law, whichever of the two provides for a greater punishment.

Section 29 – Child Welfare Committee – Juvenile Justice (Care And Protection Of Children) Act, 2000

(2) The Committee shall consist of a Chairperson and four other members as the State Government may think fit to appoint, of whom at least one shall be a woman and another, an expert on matters concerning children.

(3) The qualifications of the Chairperson and the members, and the tenure for which they may be appointed shall be such as may be prescribed.

(4) The appointment of any member of the Committee may be terminated, after holding inquiry, by the State Government, if—

(i) He has been found guilty of misuse of power vested under this Act;

(ii) He has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude, and such conviction has not been reversed or he has not been granted full pardon in respect of such offence;

(iii) He fails to attend the proceedings of the Committee for consecutive three months without any valid reason or he fails to attend less than three-fourth of the sittings in a year.

(5) The Committee shall function as a Bench of Magistrates and shall have the powers conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), on a Metropolitan Magistrate or, as the case may be, a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class.


This section provides for the constitution of Child Welfare Committees for children who are in need of care and protection. Such committees shall be constituted by the State Government by notification in its Official Gazettee.

The Child Welfare Committee shall consist of the Chairperson and four other members of whom at least one shall be a woman and another expert on matters concerning children.

Sub-section (4) lays down the disqualifications and grounds on which the membership of the committee may be terminated by the State Governor, are (i) misuse of power, (2) conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude, and (3) absence from the proceedings of the committee for consecutive three months without any valid reason or absence in less than three-fourth sittings in a year.

The Child Welfare Committee shall function as a Bench of Magistrates and have all those powers which are conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, on a Metropolitan Magistrate or a First Class Judicial Magistrate, as the case may be.

Here is your Essay on Synapses| Essay

Synapses consist of swelling at the end of nerve fibre called synaptic knob lying in close proximity to the membrane of dendrite.

The cytoplasm of this knob contains numerous mitochondria (for energy) and small synaptic vesicles containing neurotransmitter, acetylcholine for the transmission of the nerve impulse across the synapse. The gap between pre- and post- synaptic membrane is called synaptic cleft.

The presynaptic membrane is modified for the attachment of synaptic vesicles and the release of the transmitter substance into the synaptic cleft.

The postsynaptic membrane contains large protein molecules which act as receptor site for the transmitter substances and numerous channel and pores, for the movement of ions into the post-synaptic neuron.

1. The arrival of nerve impulse depolarizes the presynaptic membrane causing calcium channels to open, increasing the permeability of the membrane to calcium ions.

2. After acquiring the position in synaptic knob, calcium ions cause the synaptic vesicles to fuse with the presynaptic membrane, releasing their contents into the synaptic cleft.

3. The vesicles then return to the cytoplasm where they are refilled with transmitter substances

4. Each vesicle contains about 3000 molecules of acehylcholine.

5. Acetylcholine diffuses across the synaptic cleft and attaches to a receptor site on the postsynaptic membrane that recognized the molecular structure of acetylcholine.

6. Then acetylcholine causes the change in the shape of the receptor site which results in ion channels opening up in the post synaptic membrane in response to depolarisation.

7. Depolarisation of the membrane excites the cell, making it more likely to set up a nerve impulse (action potential).

8. Having produced a change in the permeability of the post synaptic membrane the acetylcholine is immediately removed from the synaptic cleft by enzyme acetyl cholinesterase, (also called cholinesterase).

9. This enzyme hydrolyses the acetylcholine to chorine which is then reabsorbed into the synaptic knob to be recycled into acetylcholine by synthetic pathways in the vesicle using energy from ATP.


These are low molecular mass substances released in minute amounts at interneural neuromuscular and neuroglandular synapses. It may be excitatory (depolarizing postsynaptic membrane) or inhibitory (hyperpolarizing postsynaptic membrane). Examples of neurotransmitter are –

(i) Acetylcholine (excitatory) is released at all neuromuscular junction between motor neurons and skeletal muscle cells, at all synapses between preganglionic and postganglionic in the ANS and at certain synapses between neurons in the CNS.

Enzyme acetyl cholinesterase breaks down acetylcholine into acetate and chorine and terminates the action of the transmitter.

(ii) Norepinephrine (excitatory) is secreted by some neurons of the sympathetic neurons of the CNS. It is usually inactivated by the action of an enzyme monoamine oxidase.

(iii) GABA (Gamma amino butyric acid) – It is released by synaptic knobs of the fibres of some interneurons in the CNS. It inhibits the postsynaptic regeneration of action potential hence it is called inhibitory neurotransmitter. Other example of inhibitory neurotransmitter is glycine.

Other excitatory neurotransmitters are – serotonin, dopamine, histamine, glutamate, 5 hydroxytryptamine etc.